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ABSTRACT 
KELSEY BRIANNE MAYNORD: Auditor Rotation 
(Under the direction of Dr. Bowlin) 
 
 Using an experiment, this study investigates whether auditor rotation influences 
the non-professional investors’ expectations regarding a company’s financial reporting 
aggressiveness and their willingness to invest in the company. Specifically, I explore 
whether the effects of auditor rotation differ depending on whether the entire audit firm is 
rotated or only the engagement partner.  Further, I explore whether that effect is 
moderated by whether the auditor’s rotation is mandated by law or the company chooses 
to rotate its auditor.  In an experiment using MBA students, I find little overall effect of 
the various rotation regimes.  However, I do find that under audit partner rotation the 
investors’ expect reported earnings per share to be a more conservative amount when that 
rotation is mandatory compared to when it is voluntary.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the “Act”) is enhancing 
investor confidence. In accordance with this purpose, the Act requires that audit 
engagement partners be associated with the same client for no more than five years 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). In addition, the Act also required the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (the “GAO”) to conduct a study regarding the potential effects on 
auditor independence and audit quality of extending this requirement beyond partner 
rotation to mandatory firm rotation. After completing this study, the GAO was unable to 
conclude whether mandatory firm rotation would be beneficial (GAO, 2003). Despite this 
outcome, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) is currently 
considering mandating the rotation of audit firms (PCAOB, 2011).  
A substantial amount of prior research has explored the effects of firm tenure and 
auditor rotation.  However, that research has generally focused on whether audit quality 
increases or decreases with longer auditor tenure or with auditor rotation. The results of 
those studies have been conflicting. Some studies indicate that rotation enhances audit 
quality (e.g., Dopuch et al. 2001, Carey and Simnett 2006,) and while others indicate that 
rotation decreases audit quality (e.g., Myers et al. 2003). My study differs from prior 
research in that I explore the effects of auditor rotation on investors’ expectations of a 
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company’s financial reporting aggressiveness and investors’ willingness to invest in the 
company.  In addition, I explore the differential effects of currently required engagement 
partner rotation and the proposed rotation of entire firms.  
I further examine whether the effects of auditor rotation are moderated by its 
intentionality; that is, I explore whether relative effects of partner and firm rotation 
depends on whether the rotation is mandated by law or the client’s voluntary choice. 
Prior research suggests that people make choices based on how they infer the intentions 
underlying the choices of others (McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003).  Those findings 
have implications for my setting because companies are currently able to voluntarily 
choose to rotate its audit firm. The investors’ responses to that choice would likely 
depend on the investors’ inferences regarding management’s intentions underlying that 
choice.  For example, investors could infer that a company that voluntarily chooses to 
rotate its auditors is more committed to high quality financial reporting.  
I address my research questions by conducting an experiment in which MBA 
students at the University of Mississippi take on the role of the investor. The participants 
review materials related to a fictitious company and respond to questions that elicit their 
expectations regarding the aggressiveness of the company’s earnings reports and the 
likelihood with which they would invest in the company. The results of the study suggest 
that when there is mandatory partner rotation, non-professional investors will expect 
more conservative financial reporting (i.e., lower reported earnings per share) than the 
other scenarios. This indicates that an investor would be more willing to invest in a 
company when the audit partner is required to rotate after a set number of years.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
U.S. Audit Requirements 
 Auditor rotation is not a new idea to the accounting industry. Mandatory audit 
partner rotation was implemented by the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (the AICPA) in 1970 (Chi et al. 2009).  This mandate 
specified that audit partners could only be associated with the same audit engagement for 
a maximum of seven years.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 strengthened the 
requirement and made it federal law.  Specifically the Act required that the lead audit 
partner, who has primary responsibility for the audit or who is responsible for reviewing 
the audit, rotate off of the engagement after five fiscal years (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).  
 While partner rotation has been mandatory for some time, the concept of firm 
rotation has been an unresolved object of debate for at least 35 years.  For example in 
1977, after various financial scandals, Senator Lee Metcalf, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management, issued a report (the “Metcalf 
Report”) that discussed the role of the Big Eight accounting firms and their 
independence. This report noted that a potential solution is audit firm rotation (PCAOB, 
2011). However, to this point, others have largely concluded that mandatory audit firm 
rotation was not justified in light of its potential costs.  Specifically, the Cohen 
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Commission, a group established by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (“AICPA”), discussed the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory audit 
firm rotation. However, according to this commission, the potential benefits did not 
outweigh the high costs of mandatory firm rotation, so firm rotation was not mandated 
(PCAOB, 2011).  In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has also 
considered the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation, but in 1994 the SEC staff 
concluded that new rotation requirements were not needed (PCAOB, 2011).   
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) required that the United States 
General Accounting Office, (the “GAO”) conduct a study investigating the potential 
effects of required firm rotation on public accounting firms that audit public companies. 
The GAO surveyed these companies to gather their opinions about mandatory firm 
rotation. Almost all of the responses from the firms indicated the same belief, that the 
costs of mandatory firm rotation would be more likely to exceed any benefits. 
Additionally, the GAO interviewed other stakeholders, including institutional investors, 
bankers, and consumer advocacy groups, and their responses aligned with the firms who 
responded to the survey. The GAO concluded that mandatory audit firm rotation might 
not be the answer for audit independence and increased audit quality (GAO, 2003). The 
report suggested that costs could be much higher than predicted and the benefits of audit 
firm rotation are unknown. Instead, the GAO recommended that the SEC and PCAOB 
continue to monitor audit independence and that the best course of action was to wait and 
observe the effects of the SOX reforms on audit quality and increased independence 
(GAO, 2003).   
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 In August 2011, the PCAOB issued a concept release, Release No. 2011-006, 
that explained that the PCAOB would consider requiring periodic firm rotation.  The 
release further explained that it would begin to gather public opinion on ways to enhance 
auditor independence and audit quality (PCAOB, 2011). In particular, the PCAOB 
wanted the opinions of the public on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB wanted 
the opinion of those who would have to implement the firm rotation as well as the 
investors who would be investing in these companies. It was important to gather their 
opinions because a major difference of opinion could cause the PCAOB to look into 
alternate ways of increasing independence. Currently, the PCAOB has heard various 
arguments on the advantages of mandatory firm rotation and the disadvantages of 
mandatory firm rotation. The board is in the process of determining the opinions of the 
public and professionals in accounting before moving forward with the proposal. If 
mandatory firm rotation is implemented, the board has discussed possible term lengths of 
ten years or greater (PCAOB, 2011). 
 
Audit Rotation Requirements Abroad 
 Other countries have similarly wrestled with the issue of mandating audit 
partner and audit firm rotation. The European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union responded to the financial scandals in the US by issuing Directive 2006/43/EC (the 
“8th Directive”) in 2006 (EU, 2006). The directive laid out similar objectives to financial 
reporting, as well as establishing similar audit rotation mandates. The 8th Directive 
requires mandatory audit partner rotation, which requires the lead partner to rotate from 
an audit engagement after seven years (EU, 2006). However, the European Union (the 
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“EU”) does not hold the same standard setting power as the PCAOB in the US and many 
of the members of the EU have not implemented partner rotation. Some of Europe is not 
even a member of the EU and does not have to follow the directive. 
 Some countries have implemented mandatory firm rotation, but many of 
these countries have since revoked the rotation requirements. Currently, Italy and Brazil 
are the only two countries to require mandatory firm rotation, implemented in 1975 in 
Italy and 1999 in Brazil (Raiborn, et al, 2006).  Italy’s firm rotation requirements allow a 
firm to audit a client up to nine years before the audit firm is required to rotate off of the 
engagement (GAO, 2003). However, these rotation requirements were not enough to stop 
one of the worst financial scams on the European continent to date (Raiborn, et al, 2006). 
Parmalat SpA was a multinational dairy food company headquartered in Italy. Grant 
Thornton audited the company from 1990-1999 and in 1999 Deloitte & Touche of Italy 
became the primary auditor, (Raiborn, et al, 2006). The fraud occurred in the year of the 
rotation requirement, mainly because Grant Thornton was allowed to be the secondary 
auditor, which is allowed under Italian rotation rule. The mandatory rotation requirement 
did not increase audit quality and was not effective in preventing another case of 
“financial misconduct by an accounting firm” (Raiborn et al, 2006, 38).   
 Spain adopted mandatory audit firm rotation in 1988 and enforced the rule 
until it was revoked in 1995. In Spain, an auditor could audit a company between three to 
nine years. After nine years, the audit firm was rotated off of the client and could not 
audit the same client again for another three years (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009). In their 
paper, Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. study the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain. 
They chose to analyze Spain because Spain implemented mandatory firm rotation for six 
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years before revoking it. So, they were able to study the before and after affects of 
rotation on the business environment in Spain, which is one of the few countries to 
require firm rotation. They found that mandatory firm rotation did not enhance auditor 
independence, but instead found that the reputation of the audit firm had a greater impact 
on audit independence (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al, 2009). Audit firms were influenced more 
by how they were perceived in the business world and were more likely to change their 
behavior based on these perceptions than on mandated rotation requirements.  
 Two other countries implemented mandatory audit firm rotation, but 
subsequently dropped the rule after a short period of time. Austria implemented 
mandatory firm rotation in 2004, which required the audit firm to rotate every six years 
(Cameron et al, 2005). It is not possible to see the affects of audit firm rotation in Austria 
because Austria dropped the mandate in 2005. Canada implemented mandatory audit firm 
rotation involving banks, but the banking legislation was revised in 1991 and the 
mandatory firm rotation was not included in the new legislation (Cameron et al, 2005).  
  
Prior Academic Research 
 The debate regarding auditor rotation has not been limited to the standard-
setting boards and legislators, but has also involved various researchers and scholars in 
academia. Many individuals who support mandatory audit firm rotation believe that there 
will be less pressure on the audit firm to retain a client company, which would result in 
less inappropriate financial reporting and would increase the public’s perceptions 
regarding auditor independence (Raiborn et al, 2006). The arguments against mandatory 
audit firm rotation state that a new auditor will require a certain number of years before 
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they are able to fully understand the company’s operations that lack of knowledge will 
reduce audit quality (Raiborn et al, 2006). The lack of knowledge will require the 
auditors to spend more time understanding the company and the business issues, which 
will increase costs of the audit.  
 Substantial prior research has explored the effects of audit firm rotation or 
audit partner rotation on overall audit quality. These research papers include archival 
studies and experimental studies attempting to reach conclusions regarding the effects of 
audit firm rotation on actual auditor independence and audit quality. 
 The majority of prior research regarding auditor rotation has been archival in 
nature and has yielded conflicting results.  For example, several previous studies find that 
auditor rotation improves measures of audit quality (e.g., Dopuch et al 2001, Davis et al. 
2002), others suggest that longer auditor tenure improves audit quality (e.g., Myers et al 
2003 and Mansi et al. 2004), while yet others indicate no effect of auditor rotation and 
tenure (e.g., Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 2009, Kaplan and Mauldin 2008, Chi et al. 2009). 
 Among a small number of prior experimental studies, the Dopuch, King, & 
Schwartz (2001) paper investigates the relationship between mandatory rotation of audit 
partners and auditor independence. They designed an experiment to measure auditor’s 
independence, which they proxy by the willingness of the auditor to issue reports biased 
in favor of management (Dopuch, King, & Swartz, 2001). The paper investigates auditor 
independence under required audit partner rotation, required auditor retention, a scenario 
that does not require either and a scenario that requires both. The experimental design 
included six “managers” and six “auditors” for each of the four conditions, where each 
manager would interact with one auditor.  
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 The results of their experiment favor mandatory rotation because mandated 
audit partner rotation resulted in the lowest frequency of reports favoring management. 
The highest frequency of favored reports occurred in the regimes without mandatory 
rotation or retention (Dopuch, King, & Swartz, 2001). The researchers attribute this to the 
economic incentives available to auditors in the long-term relationship with management.  
 In another experimental study, researchers explored the relationship between 
mandatory auditor rotation and professional skepticism on overall audit quality. They 
designed an experiment that explored the effect of skepticism in the relationship between 
auditor and client (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercy, 2011). Their results suggest that the effect 
of mandatory audit partner rotation on audit quality depended on the whether the auditor 
evaluated the client’s integrity or dishonesty, which differs depending on the specific 
audit task (Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercy, 2011). Specifically they find that audit rotation 
commonly increased audit quality when focused on manager’s honesty and decreased 
audit quality when focused on the manager’s dishonesty, when the auditors used 
professional skepticism. Also, the ability to talk to the clients increased the level of trust 
the auditor placed in clients, which sometimes caused the auditor to decrease the effort on 
the audit quality. This would be in favor of rotation because the longer an auditor engages 
a client; the level of trust builds to the point where the auditor may decrease their audit 
effort.  
 Wang & Tuttle (2008) experimentally examine the effects of auditor rotation 
on auditor-client negotiations. Their findings suggested that mandatory firm rotation 
causes changes in the relationships between the auditor and the client, which increase the 
likelihood of non-cooperation resulting in an impasse between auditor and client. Further, 
 10 
their findings indicate that, “negotiated asset values were more likely to diverge from 
client-preferred values with mandatory rotation” (Wang & Tuttle, 2008, 240). The effects 
of this conclusion extend beyond the auditor-client relationship and delve into the effect 
on the investor. 
 As described above, nearly all the prior research on auditor rotation has 
focused on the auditor-client relationship and how this relationship affects the overall 
audit quality and actual auditor independence. However, in a study closely related to my 
research question, Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) examine the relative effects of audit firm 
and audit partner rotation and the strength or weakness of the audit committee on 
investors’ perceptions of auditor independence and investors’ willingness to invest. That 
is, where others have focused on rotation’s effects on audit quality, Kaplan and Mauldin 
(2008) focus on the impact of rotation on investors’ judgments and investment choices. 
They did not find any difference between the two modes of audit rotation on auditor 
independence, but they did find that investor perceptions of auditor independence 
increased under a strong audit committee versus a weak audit committee (Kaplan and 
Mauldin, 2008).  
 The research question examined in this paper differs from Kaplan and 
Mauldin (2008) in that I incrementally explore whether the voluntary or mandatory 
nature of the rotation moderates the relative effects of audit firm and audit partner 
rotation on investor’s expectations of financial reporting aggressiveness and their 
willingness to invest. This question is important because companies could potentially 
voluntarily choose to rotate audit firms or to require their auditors to rotate engagement 
partners.  Such voluntary rotation could be used as to signal a company’s commitment to 
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high quality financial reporting. However, a government mandate that audit firms or 
partners be rotated would eliminate that signaling mechanism and therefore potentially 
affects investors’ perceptions of financial reporting quality and their willingness to invest.
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III. HYPOTHESIS 
According to its preamble, one of the primary purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) was to increase investors’ confidence in financial statements and in the U.S. 
capital markets. Because SOX included a partner rotation requirement and demanded the 
study of firm rotation, the implementation of the SOX implied that Congress believed 
that such rotation would make improve investor’s trust. Therefore, in this study I test this 
prediction that rotation will positively affect investor’s confidence in reporting and will 
increase investors’ willingness to invest. 
Hypothesis 1a: Investor expectations of conservative reporting increases 
under the rotation regimes relative to the no rotation regime. 
Hypothesis 1b: Investor willingness to invest increases under the rotation 
regimes relative to the no rotation regimes. 
My second test is a replication of prior research. Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) did 
not find a significant difference in non-professional investors’ financial reporting 
expectations or willingness to invest under audit firm rotation relative to audit partner 
rotation. Consistent with this prior research, I make the following null predictions:  
Hypothesis 2a: Investor expectations of conservative reporting does not 
increase under the firm rotation relative to partner rotation. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Investor willingness to invest does not increase under firm 
rotation relative to partner rotation. 
In this study, I also examine the relative effects of mandatory versus voluntary 
rotation, as well as no rotation on investor’s willingness to invest in a company. Prior 
research in psychology and accounting suggests that people infer the intentions of others 
based on the choices other people make (Christ 2008).  For example, in the absence of 
mandated auditor rotation, companies could voluntarily choose to implement a policy 
requiring that their audit partner or audit firm be periodically rotated.  Investors could 
interpret such a choice as a signal that the company is committed to high quality financial 
reporting, transparency, etc. When law mandates auditor rotation, the potential for this 
signal is lost. 
Therefore, I predict that voluntary rotation improves investors’ trust in financial 
reporting and investor willingness to invest. 
Hypothesis 3A: Investor expectations of conservative reporting increases 
under voluntary rotation relative to mandatory rotation. 
Hypothesis 3B: Investor willingness to invest increases under voluntary 
rotation relative to mandatory rotation. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
I address my research questions using a laboratory experiment in which 55 
volunteers recruited from an MBA course at the University of Mississippi review an 
investment case and make judgments in the role of investors.1,2 Before proceeding with 
their task, each participant signed a consent form, confirming that they understood that 
they were voluntarily participating in this study and that their identities would remain 
anonymous.  As part of the case, the participants completed a questionnaire that included 
questions regarding their demographic and other background information including age, 
years of work experience, gender, investment experience, and a self-assessment of their 
ability to understand financial statements. Table 1 provides a summary of their responses. 
The students were not asked to put their name or any other identifying personal 
information on the materials given to them, so as to maintain their anonymity during the 
study.  
                                                
1 The participants were recruited from one MBA course in the Patterson School of 
Accountancy.  These participants received bonus points in that course in exchange for 
their participation. 
2 The University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed participant 
materials for this study and provided approval of the use of human subjects. 
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The scenarios were given to Ole Miss MBA students with those students taking 
on the role of investors tasked with making certain investment related judgments and 
decisions. By asking them to take on the role of the investor, I am able to learn whether 
the different auditor rotation treatments affect their expectations of conservative financial 
reporting and their willingness to invest in the company. 
 
Experimental Methodology and Design 
 The experiment took place in two different sessions, with a total of fifty-five 
students participating in the study. The participants were given a set of materials that 
were developed based on case materials used by Kaplan and Mauldin (2008). These 
materials described a publicly traded company, International Auto Parts (IAP). The 
background information on the company included relevant pre-audit balances, such as 
sales, total assets, and earnings per share. Participants are told that the same audit firm 
has audited IAP for the last five years. However, depending on the treatment condition, 
participants are provided with different information regarding auditor rotation policies.  
Specifically, participants were assigned to one of the following five treatments 
conditions: 
A: Control, neither the audit partner or audit firm rotated  
B: Mandatory audit firm rotation 
C: Mandatory audit partner rotation  
D: Voluntary audit firm rotation 
E: Voluntary audit partner rotation 
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The materials in all of the treatment conditions described all of the potential 
treatments so that each participant was aware that other auditor rotation policies could 
exist. The materials also clearly explained which specific treatment the company was 
operating under.  
The materials were labeled A-E, to make it easier to analyze the results. The 
materials were coded this way so that each scenario would be evenly distributed to gather 
a large enough sample for results. The materials were coded with the letter and a number 
so that I would know how many sets of each treatment were distributed. The materials 
were placed in consecutive order A1 to E1 and the order was repeated for 2, 3 and so on. 
Then I distributed the materials to the participants’ in that sequence in order to ensure I 
would have an equal sample sizes for each treatment.  
The materials included a description of the role of the audit committee and the 
audit partner to make sure that all of the participants had the same basic understanding of 
these two roles. Also, a short description of auditor rotation was included to explain the 
role of rotation in audits. These were all included in the materials because I wanted the 
participants to all be exposed to the same basic knowledge as some of the participants 
may have had a background in accounting and would already know these terms  
After reading the background and audit rotation requirements, the participants 
were told that during the audit, the auditors uncovered an audit difference and that the 
difference caused the earnings per share to be overstated. The questions that followed 
asked the participants to report the level of earnings-per-share (EPS) that they expected to 
ultimately be reported in the financial statements. There were four options for their 
expectations of reported EPS: $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, and $1.10. If the expected EPS was 
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lower, then the investor was expecting more conservative reporting, and if the expected 
EPS was higher then the investor was expecting more aggressive reporting. In addition, 
the participants were asked “What is the likelihood that you would invest in this 
company?”. Responses were provided on a seven-point Likert scale that ranged from 
“highly unlikely” to “highly likely”. 
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V. RESULTS 
The participants included 55 MBA students and Table 1 provides summary 
demographic and background information regarding all of the participants. This table is 
importantly demonstrates the participants’ background professional experience, investing 
experience and self-assessed ability to understand financial statements. On average, my 
participants have 1.6 years of professional work experience, about 63% have owned 
stock, and on average, they judge their ability to understand financial statements as a 4.0 
on a 7 point scale where 1 indicates very low ability and 7 indicates very high ability. 
This background information provides a basis for classifying the participants’ as non-
professional investors.   
Table 2 shows the demographic and background information of the participants 
by experimental condition. The participants were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions with eleven participants’ in each condition. This random assignment is 
expected to result in an even distribution of the prior experience that could influence the 
way in which my manipulated variables affect investor judgments.  Untabulated 
ANOVAs indicates that these demographic and background variables do not differ 
among experimental conditions, except for experience owning stock, which did not 
qualitatively affect the results. 
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of All Experimental Participants   
   
    
    
Mean 
SD. 
Deviation 
All Conditions   
Age 23.182 2.099 
Years of Professional work experience 1.636 2.107 
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.545 0.502 
Experience owning stock (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.636 0.511 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1 = very low,  7 = very 
high) 4.045 1.345 
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Table 2: Profile of the participants in the five experimental 
treatment conditions   
 
Mean 
SD. 
Deviation 
Condition A   
Age 23.000 1.991 
Years of Professional work experience 1.636 2.976 
Gender (o, male or 1, female) 0.545 0.522 
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes) 0.636 0.592 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very 
high) 4.045 1.457 
      
Condition B   
Age 23.727 2.453 
Years of Professional work experience 1.455 2.207 
Gender (o, male or 1, female) 0.455 0.522 
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes) 0.455 0.522 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very 
high) 4.045 1.193 
      
Condition C   
Age 23.545 2.018 
Years of Professional work experience 1.955 1.710 
Gender (o, male or 1, female) 0.364 0.505 
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes) 0.091 0.302 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very 
high) 4.182 1.677 
      
Condition D   
Age 23.636 2.248 
Years of Professional work experience 1.455 2.162 
Gender (o, male or 1, female) 0.364 0.505 
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes) 0.545 0.522 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very 
high) 3.500 1.597 
      
Condition E   
Age 23.000 2.098 
Years of Professional work experience 0.636 1.343 
Gender (o, male or 1, female) 0.545 0.522 
Experience owning stock (0, no and 1, yes) 0.909 0.302 
Ability to understand financial reporting (1, very low to 7, very 
high) 3.773 0.786 
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Recall that Hypothesis 1a and 1b predicted that investor expectations of 
conservative reporting and their willingness to invest would increase under rotation 
regimes relative to no rotation regimes. As shown in Table 3, Panel A, the mean and 
standard deviation (SD) of expected earnings per share are 1.54 (0.934) and 2.00 (1.057) 
under the no rotation regime and combined rotation regimes, respectively, indicating that 
non-professional investors expect more conservative reporting when there is no rotation 
of any kind. While this result is contrary to Hypothesis 1a, this difference is not 
statistically significant (t = _1.40, p = 0.17). In Table 4, Panel A, the mean and standard 
deviation (SD) of investor willingness to invest are 3.68 (1.876) and 3.47 (1.014) under 
no rotation regime and rotation regimes, respectively. According to the results, investors 
are slightly more willing to invest under no rotation relative to rotation regime, which is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1b. However, this difference is also not significant (t = 1.54, 
p = 0.15). 
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Table 3: Analysis of expected EPS
a
     
  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics   Auditor Rotation 
Rotation   Partner  Firm Combined Control 
   N N N  
   Mean Mean Mean  
   (SD) (SD) (SD)  
Voluntary   11 11 22  
   2.55 1.82 2.18  
   (1.04) (1.25) (1.18)  
       
Mandatory   11 11 22  
   1.64 2.00 1.82  
   (0.92) (0.89) (0.91)  
       
Combined   22  22  44   
   2.09  1.91 2.00   
   (1.06) (1.06) (1.06)  
       
Control      11 
      1.54 
      (0.93) 
       
Panel B: ANOVA-Expected EPS    
    
Effect   df F Prob.   
Firm Rotation vs Partner 
Rotation 1 0.34 0.56   
Voluntary Rotation vs 
Mandatory Rotation 1 1.36 0.25   
Interaction of Effects 1 3.05 0.09   
      
a 
Participants indicated expected EPS of either $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, or $1.10; however, I have recoded these 
choices to 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of investors' willingness to investb    
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  Auditor Rotation 
Rotation   Partner  Firm Combined Control 
   N N N  
   Mean Mean Mean  
   (SD) (SD) (SD)  
Voluntary   11 11 22  
   3.32 3.32 3.32  
   (0.75) (0.90) (1.15)  
       
Mandatory   11 11 22  
   3.50 3.73 3.61  
   (0.98) (0.75) (0.86)  
       
Combined   22 22 44  
   3.41 3.52 3.47  
   (1.18) (0.84) (1.014)  
       
Control      11 
      3.68 
      (1.88) 
       
Panel B: ANOVA-investors willingness to invest    
    
Effect  df F Prob.   
Firm Rotation vs Partner 
Rotation 1 0.13 0.72   
Voluntary Rotation vs 
Mandatory Rotation 1 0.89 0.35   
Interaction of Effects 1 0.13 0.72   
      
b 
Measured on a seven point scale 1(highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely) 
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a 
Participants indicated expected EPS of either $1.07, $1.08, $1.09, or $1.10; however, I have recoded these 
choices to 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
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Figure 1: Expectation of Reported EPS by Treatmenta 
Voluntary Rotation 
Firm Rotation 
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  Hypothesis 2a makes the null prediction that investor expectations of conservative 
reporting will not be higher under the firm rotation regime relative to the partner rotation 
regime. Table 3, Panel A indicates that the mean and standard deviation of earnings per 
share are 1.91 (1.07) and 2.09 (1.07) for firm rotation and partner rotation, respectively, 
indicating that investors’ expected more conservative reporting under firm rotation 
relative to partner rotation, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Table 3, Panel B indicates that 
this main effect is not significant; therefore, I do not reject the null prediction of 
Hypothesis 2a. 
  Hypothesis 2b similarly suggests that investor willingness to invest will not be 
higher under firm rotation relative to partner rotation. The mean and standard deviation of 
investors’ willingness to invest are 3.52 (0.84) and 3.41 (1.18) for firm rotation and 
partner rotation, respectively, and are shown in Table 4, Panel A. According to the 
ANOVA in Table 4, Panel B, there is no significant difference between the two means. 
Firm rotation was only slightly higher than partner rotation, but there was not enough of a 
difference to say that investors’ preferred one to the other. Panel B shows that the 
difference between firm rotation or partner rotation is only slightly significant (F = 0.13, 
p = 0.72) and so only slightly influences investors’ willingness to invest. 
  Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted the effects of voluntary and mandatory rotation on 
expectations on conservative reporting and willingness to invest. Hypothesis 3a predicted 
that investor expectations of conservative reporting increased under voluntary rotation 
relative to mandatory rotation. As show in Table 3, Panel A, the mean and standard 
deviation are 2.18 (1.18) and 1.82 (0.91) for voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation, 
respectively. This result indicated that, contrary to Hypothesis 3a, investors expected 
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more conservative reporting under mandatory rotation relative to voluntary rotation.  
However, according to the ANOVA in Table 3, Panel B, this difference is not significant 
(F = 1.36, p = 0.25). 
  Hypothesis 3b predicted that investor willingness to invest would increase under 
voluntary rotation relative to mandatory rotation. Table 4, Panel A summarizes the means 
and standard deviations related to this hypothesis. The mean and standard deviation are 
3.32 (1.15) and 3.61 (1.01) for voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation, respectively. 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis 3b, investors are more willing to invest when 
mandatory rotation occurs for audit partner or firms than when they are voluntarily 
rotated. Panel B in Table 4 indicates that the difference in investor willingness to invest 
between the voluntary rotation and mandatory rotation conditions is not significant (F = 
0.89, p = 0.35). 
It is important to note that while the main effects of partner/firm rotation and 
voluntary/mandatory rotation are not significant and do not support my hypothesis, these 
two variables do interact to affect investor expectations of conservative financial 
reporting.  Specifically, as indicated in Table 3 and Figure 1, under firm rotation, there is 
little difference in investors’ financial reporting expectations between the mandatory and 
voluntary rotation conditions (2.00 and 1.82, respectively).  However, under the partner 
rotation condition, the difference in investor expectations between the mandatory and 
voluntary rotation conditions is larger (1.64 and 2.55, respectively).  The interaction term 
in the ANOVA in Table 3, Panel B suggests that these differences are not due to chance 
(F = 3.05, p = 0.09). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 My study examines important questions regarding audit rotation and investor 
behavior that have been the subject of many debates among standard setters but have 
been the subject of little previous academic research. This study focuses on non-
professional investors and their investment behavior under various rotation conditions. 
Specifically, I explore the relative effects of partner and firm rotation as well as 
mandatory versus voluntary rotation on investors’ expectations of conservative reporting 
and their willingness to invest.   
 In general, the results of the study indicate little difference in investor 
expectations of conservative reporting and willingness to invest under the various 
rotation conditions. However, when rotation is required, the investors’ expect more 
conservative reporting and exhibit a greater willingness to invest when the rotation is 
mandatory when only the partner is required to rotate. These results are important as they 
indicate that, contrary to the beliefs of proponents of auditor rotation, non-professional 
investors are not necessarily more trusting of company management or more willing to 
investor when auditor independence is enhanced through rotation. 
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As with any experimental research, there are always limitations. My study used 
MBA students to take on the role of the non-professional investor. Therefore, my results 
may not generalize to populations that include more sophisticated, professional investors.  
 The case materials used in this study describe a fictitious company with a only a 
limited amount of information being given to the participants. The participants were 
provided with few details of the company and their auditors, and while this enhances the 
degree of experimental control, real-world investors would likely have access to much 
more information about the company. It is possible that investors would behave 
differently when more comprehensive information is provided. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
September, 2012 
 
Thank you for participating in this study of investor decision-making based on financial 
and non-financial information.  This is a great opportunity for you to contribute in a 
meaningful way to research.  Our research, along with the work of others, is intended to 
advance our understanding of the financial reporting process and be informative to 
financial reporting policy setters.   
 
The study takes about 10-15 minutes and involves reading a brief scenario describing a 
public company preparing their annual financial statements.  During the audit, the auditor 
discovers a potentially important audit difference.  An audit difference occurs when the 
company has recorded an event and/or transaction in the financial statements differently 
than the auditors believe is appropriate under generally accepted accounting principles.  
Following the scenario, you will be asked to provide your impressions about the outcome 
and the behavior of management, the auditor, and the audit committee, and then answer 
some questions about your background.   
 
In the scenario many of the complexities of the actual decision making environment have 
been simplified to limit the demands of your time as well as to aid interpretation of your 
responses.  The validity of this study and its contribution depend on your cooperation.  
While the scenario is brief, it is important that you read and attend to the material 
carefully.  Also, because there are several versions of the scenario, it is important that you 
complete your questionnaire independently.   
 
You are not identified in any way on any form.  No forms are numbered and we do not 
ask your name at any time.  Your participation is voluntary and you can quit at any time.  
If you have any questions, please contact me at Kbmaynor@go.olemiss.edu.  For 
additional information regarding human participation in research, please feel free to 
contact the Campus IRB Office.  
 
Thank you for your participation.   
 
Kelsey Maynord 
School of Accountancy 
 
University of Mississippi 
Kelsey Maynord 
 
Kbmaynor@go.olemiss.edu 
PHONE (423) 987-2440 
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Background 
 
On the next page, you will be asked to estimate a typical, publicly traded, company’s 
response to a set of circumstances.  When making that assessment, assume the following 
about the company and its financial reporting process.  
 
International Auto Parts (IAP) is a publicly traded medium-sized automobile parts 
manufacturer and it is headquartered in a legal jurisdiction outside of the United States. 
IAP’s management is responsible for preparing and certifying the company’s financial 
statements.   
 
The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for 
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether 
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company. 
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the 
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular 
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of 
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some 
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of 
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, but this jurisdiction does not 
require the audit partner or the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated 
with a company. The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily.  The audit 
committee of the Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these 
activities by management and the independent auditor.     
 
B: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for 
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether 
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company. 
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the 
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular 
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of 
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some 
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of 
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does 
require the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated with a company. 
The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily.  The audit committee of the Board of 
Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by management and 
the independent auditor.] 
 
C: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for 
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether 
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company. 
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the 
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular 
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of 
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some 
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voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of 
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, but this jurisdiction does 
require the audit partner to be limited in the number of years associated with a company. 
The company has chosen not to rotate voluntarily.  The audit committee of the Board of 
Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by management and 
the independent auditor.] 
 
D: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for 
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether 
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company. 
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the 
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular 
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of 
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some 
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of 
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does not 
require the audit firm to be limited in the number of years associated with a company. 
The company has chosen to rotate voluntarily the audit firm.  The audit committee of the 
Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by 
management and the independent auditor.] 
 
E: [The independent auditor, an international public accounting firm, is responsible for 
auditing the financial statements. Legal jurisdictions around the world vary in whether 
audit firms are limited in the number of years they may audit a particular company. 
Among jurisdictions that do not require this accounting firm rotation, some limit the 
number of years an audit partner may be associated with the audit of a particular 
company. In jurisdictions where neither firms nor partner are limited in the number of 
years, the firms can be associated with a particular client as long as they like. Some 
voluntarily rotate their audit periodically or ask their audit firms to rotate the partner of 
the audit. Some jurisdictions put these limitations in place, and this jurisdiction does not 
require the audit partner to be limited in the number of years associated with a company. 
The company has chosen to rotate voluntarily the audit partner.  The audit committee of 
the Board of Directors is responsible for overseeing the conduct of these activities by 
management and the independent auditor.] 
 
Audit Committee 
 
The audit committee reports to and acts on behalf of the Board of Directors and is 
composed of 3 members.   
• All members are independent outside directors (i.e., no relationship between the 
directors and the company or its officers).   
• Two of the members are CPAs.  All three are financial experts as defined by the 
SEC.     
During the year the audit committee meets 6 times.  At each meeting, the committee 
meets the senior members of management, the vice president of internal audit, and the 
independent auditors in private, separate sessions.   
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Audit Differences 
 
Recall that an audit difference occurs when the company has recorded an event and/or 
transaction in the financial statements differently than the auditors believe is appropriate 
under generally accepted accounting principles.  Such an audit difference is considered 
an uncorrected audit difference when management does not change the financial 
statements.  No adjustment to the financial statements is needed if management, audit 
committee, and the audit partner believes that the dollar amount of the audit difference is 
immaterial to the financial statements taken as a whole.  
 
Audit Partner Role 
 
The objective of the audit is to assess risk management and negotiate with management 
about misstatements on the financial statements. The audit report is the final product of 
the audit and it is the way auditors communicate the audit findings to the users. The role 
of the audit partner is to lead a team of auditors and managing the audit. The audit partner 
is also in charge of collecting evidence to verify the financial statements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IAP has just completed the process of preparing their annual financial statements.  For 
the current year, relevant pre-audit balances were: 
 
Sales    $1,300 million 
Total assets   $1,100 million 
Inventories   $   375 million 
Net earnings    $   110 million 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) $   1.10 per share 
 
Analysts’ Consensus Forecast: 
As a public company, the company’s stock has attracted a modest following by financial 
analysts.  For the current year, financial analysts’ consensus EPS forecast for IAP is: 
 
  Forecasted EPS $   1.09 per share 
 
Audit Difference: 
During the audit, the auditor uncovered only one potentially important audit difference.  
The difference is due to management’s estimate of the inventory obsolescence allowance.  
The auditor believes that the recorded allowance is outside a reasonable range by an 
amount that overstates current earnings per share by $.03 (2.7% of earnings, .08% of 
inventory, and .02% of total assets). 
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Required: Based on the information above and assuming the new proposal on the 
preceding page is in effect, please answer the following questions.  
 
1. The most likely EPS amount a public company such as IAP would finally report 
in the audited financial statements for the year is (circle one): 
 
$1.07  $1.08  $1.09  $1.10 
    All of the audit          None of the audit    
   difference corrected       difference corrected  
  
2. The proportion of public companies in similar circumstances that would finally 
report each of these audited EPS amounts for the year is (fill in each blank; 
amounts should total to 100%): 
 
EPS   $1.07  $1.08  $1.09  $1.10 
Percent Reporting ____%  ____%  ____%  ____% 
  
3. An item becomes “material” when it would affect the decisions of a reasonably 
informed financial statement user. Please indicate your impressions of the relative 
materiality of the described audit difference of $.03 per share.  
 
     |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
 Not Material            Highly   
 At All            Material 
 
4. What is the likelihood that you would invest in this company? 
 
|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
Not at All           Highly   
 Likely           Likely 
 
 
 
Additional Questions 
 
Without looking back, please answer the following questions about the IAP’s scenario.   
 
1.  Actual earnings per share will miss (be below) the analysts’ consensus forecast if 
management fully corrects the audit difference. 
 
     |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
 Completely                     Completely  
 Disagree        Agree 
 
2  Please rate IAP’s audit committee along the following dimensions:  
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a. Independence       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very weak                                              very strong 
b. Expertise       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                               very high 
c. Diligence/Effort       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                              very high 
 
3. Please rate IAP’s audit partner along the following dimensions: 
 
a. Independence 
 
      |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very weak                                              very strong 
b. Expertise       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                               very high 
c. Diligence/Effort       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                              very high 
d. Trustworthiness       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                              very high 
 
4. Please rate IAP’s management along the following dimensions: 
 
a. Expertise       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                               very high 
b. Diligence/Effort       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                              very high 
 
c. Trustworthiness       |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
very low                                              very high 
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Background Questions 
 
1.  What is your gender?    Male  Female 
 
2.  How many years of professional work experience do you have?   ____ years 
 
3.  How old are you?              ____ years 
 
4.  Do you currently own or have you owned stocks in the past?    Yes   No 
 
5. Please assess your understanding of financial reporting. 
   
            |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
              Very low                           very high   
 
6.  In general, how important are the following groups in improving the credibility of 
financial reporting by companies? 
 
a. Management 
 
     |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
Not important                           very important 
 
b. Audit Committee 
 
     |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
Not important                           very important 
 
c. External Auditor 
 
     |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
Not important                           very important 
 
7. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, a board member of a public 
company?  Yes     No 
 
8. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, an audit committee member of a 
public company?    Yes        No 
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9.  Are you currently, or have you in the past been, an outside auditor?  Yes   No 
 
10. Are you currently, or have you in the past been, part of the management team 
responsible for financial reporting?  Yes     No 
 
 
Attitudes about Management and Auditing 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the statements by placing a 
mark on the scale that most closely corresponds to your belief.  
  
1. The financial statements contained in the annual report to stockholders are the 
result of a negotiation process between management and their external auditors. 
 
            |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
      Strongly disagree           neutral                    strongly agree 
 
2. Higher uncertainty about uncorrected audit differences reduces the overall 
credibility of the annual audited financial statements. 
 
            |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
      Strongly disagree           neutral                    strongly agree 
 
3. Higher uncertainty about uncorrected audit differences reduces the overall 
trustworthiness of the annual audited financial statements. 
 
            |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
      Strongly disagree           neutral                    strongly agree 
 
4. My assessment of the trustworthiness of the annual audited financial statements 
strongly influences my investment decision. 
 
            |--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------| 
      Strongly disagree           neutral                    strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.   
 
 
 
